Rate Court Sets ASCAP Fee For Pandora

IN RE PETITION OF PANDORA MEDIA, INC., No. 12 Civ. 8035 (S.D.N.Y. filed 03/18/14) [Doc. 738].

In a lengthy decision, the ASCAP rate court held that: "The headline rate for the ASCAP-Pandora license for the years 2011 through 2015 is set at 1.85% of revenue for every year of the license term. Pandora is entitled to take a deduction for any direct payments to publishers made following their partial withdrawals from ASCAP."

SESAC Can't Escape Antitrust Claims

Meredith Corp. v. SESAC LLC, No. 09 Civ. 9177 (PAE)., 2014 BL 57263 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 03, 2014).


The issue in this putative class action is whether SESAC's licensing practices since 2008 have violated federal antitrust law. Plaintiffs are groups of local television stations.  They sue SESAC aand allege that, in practice, they must obtain licenses for some music in SESAC's repertory. That is because SESAC's repertory is large and includes works so ubiquitous that some are inevitably embedded in shows that the stations acquire and wish to air.  Plaintiffs contend that, since 2008, SESAC, with its affiliates' assent, has taken steps to make illusory any alternative to the blanket license it sells, which conveys the right to play the music of all SESAC affiliates.  Having insulated this product from competition and forced local television stations to acquire it, plaintiffs allege, SESAC has set an exorbitant price for that "all or nothing" license, even though stations have no interest in buying the rights to the entirety of SESAC's repertory. Plaintiffs assert that SESAC and its affiliates have thereby violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, by combining to unlawfully restrain trade; and § 2 of the same Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2, by conspiring to monopolize the market for the performance rights to the musical works within SESAC's repertory.  Plaintiffs also assert a monopolization claim against SESAC under § 2.

SESAC moved for summary judgment. The Court denied the motion as to all three counts, except that on the § 1 claim, the Court granted summary judgment to defendants in two ways that narrowed that claim. Specifically, the Court rejected plaintiffs' (1) per se theory of liability; and (2) claim of an agreement to restrain trade among all 20,000-plus SESAC affiliates, as opposed to among only the far smaller subset (under 1%) of affiliates who were party to a supplemental affiliation agreement with SESAC.

The Court first reviewed the history of antitrust litigation involving the PROs' licensing practices. The Court then considered the § 1 claim, assessing whether (1) the conduct plaintiffs assail is amenable to per se condemnation; (2) there is adequate evidence of concerted action among SESAC's affiliates to restrain trade; and (3) the evidence would support a conclusion that the anti-competitive effects of SESAC's conduct outweighed its pro-competitive tendencies, i.e., whether a jury could find harm to competition. The Court then considered the § 2 claims, addressing first the monopolization claim and then the claim of a conspiracy to monopolize.

ASCAP Required To License ALL Songs In Its Repertory To Pandora

In re Petition of Pandora Media, Inc., No. 1:12-cv-08035-DLC (S.D.N.Y. Opinion & Order filed 09/17/13) [Doc. 70], related to U.S. v. ASCAP, No. 41 Civ. 1395.

ASCAP must license all songs in its repertory to Pandora, even though certain music publishers have purported to withdraw from ASCAP the right to license their compositions to “New Media” services such as Pandora, holds the ASCAP rate court in interpreting the consent decree under which ASCAP operates.  "Because the language of the consent decree unambiguously requires ASCAP to provide Pandora with a license to perform all of the works in its repertory, and because ASCAP retains the works of 'withdrawing' publishers in its repertory even if it purports to lack the right to license them to a subclass of New Media entities, Pandora’s motion for summary judgment is granted."

In April 2011, ASCAP began to allow members to withdraw from ASCAP its rights to license their music to New Media outlets, while allowing ASCAP to retain the right to license those works to other outlets.  Subsequently, several music publishers withdrew their New Media licensing rights from ASCAP, and Pandora then engaged in license negotiations directly with those publishers.  On July 1, 2013, Pandora filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking a determination that “ASCAP publisher ‘withdrawals’ [of New Media rights] during the term of Pandora’s consent decree license do not affect the scope of the ASCAP
repertory subject to that license."  ASCAP argued that “’ASCAP repertory’ refers only to the rights in musical works that ASCAP has been granted by its members as of a particular moment in time.” Pandora argued that ASCAP repertory” is a “defined term[] articulated in terms of ‘works’ or ‘compositions,’ as opposed to in terms of a gerrymandered parcel of ‘rights.’” The Court found that Pandora was correct.  “ASCAP repertory” is defined in the consent decree in terms of “works” and not “individual rights” in works with respect to classes of potential licensees.  The Court also held that Pandora's subsequent negotiations with the publishers did not alter interpretation of the consent decree because Pandora is not a party to the consent decree.

2d Cir Affirms Adjustable Carve Out Rates For Performance Rights Licenses

BMI v. DMX, Inc., Docket Nos. 10-3429-cv and 11-127-cv (2d Cir. decided June 13, 2012) (decision).

The 2d Circuit holds that the consent decrees with the performing rights organizations permits blanket licenses subject to carve-outs to account for direct licensing by the music user.  Then, the 2d Circuit held that the rate-court (SDNY) set reasonable rates.

Downloads Not Public Performances; Fees Must Be Recalculated

US v. American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers, 09-0539-cv (L), NYLJ [web_id_#], at *1 (Court, Decided September 28, 2010) [LINK]

"This case presents two distinct questions that arise from the transmittal of musical works over the Internet: First, whether a download of a digital file containing a musical work constitutes a public performance of that musical work; and, second, whether the district court, acting in its capacity as the rate court, was reasonable in its assessment of the blanket license fees of Yahoo! Inc. and RealNetworks, Inc. (collectively, "the Internet Companies") to publicly perform any of the millions of musical compositions in the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP") repertory.

For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the district court's ruling that a download of a musical work does not constitute a public performance of that work, but we vacate the district court's assessment of fees for the blanket ASCAP licenses sought by the Internet Companies and remand for further proceedings."

ASCAP Blanket Fees for YouTube

U.S. v. ASCAP, NYLJ 5/21/2009 "Decision of Interest" (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2009) (Connor, J.)

Proceeding was before the Court for the setting of interim fees for a blanket license for the public performance of any of the more than two million musical compositions in the repertory of the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP") on the streaming video service provided on the Internet by YouTube, LLC f/k/a YouTube, Inc. ("YouTube").

The Court saw no reason why the basic formula that ASCAP proposed and the Court adopted in United States v. ASCAP in re AOL, RealNetworks and Yahoo! Inc., 562 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("In re AOL, et al.") was not equally appropriate in the present context.

It is therefore ordered (1) Within thirty days YouTube shall pay to ASCAP the sum of $1,610,000 for interim fees accrued through March 31, 2009; and (2) Within one week after the end of each calendar month after March 2009 until the determination of final fees in this proceeding, YouTube shall pay to ASCAP the sum of $70,000 for interim fees accruing during that month. These interim fees are subject to retroactive adjustment when final fees are determined.