Label Ordered To Pay Country Singer's Attorney's Fees After Dropping Copyright Suit

A-Blake Records v. Cassidy, No. 14-cv-3401 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2016).

A record label that sued a country singer for copyright infringement, but then conceded that there was no liability and asked the court to dismiss the case with prejudice, was ordered to pay the country singer's attorney's fees under the Copyright Act.  "Because the original suit was baseless, retaliatory, and it promotes the purposes of the copyright law, the singer will be awarded litigation costs and reasonable attorney's fees."  The label, apparently, filed the suit in retaliation for the singer filing for bankruptcy with a $700,000 debt owed the label (the label failed to meet the deadline to dispute the discharge of its claim in the bankruptcy).

Beyonce Dodges Copyright Claim In "XO" v "XOXO" Case

Lane v. Carter et al., No. 14-cv-6798 (SDNY filed 10/21/15) [Doc. 51].

Plaintiff's claim, alleging that he gave a copy of his song XOXO to one of Beyonce's background singers and that Beyonce infringed the song when she created the song XO, was dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and 8(a).  First, the Court found that although Plaintiff holds a copyright registration for the lyrics to XOXO, the registration excluded rights to the music which was the sole basis of the copyright claim.  Moreover, even though Plaintiff alleged that he was an exclusive licensee, he did not allege that hte licensor had a valdily registred copyright.  Accordingly, the claim was dismissed for lack of standing. 

Even though that was potentially curable on an amended pleading, the Court found then considered whether a copyright infringement claim was otherwise substantively viable.  The Court then underwent a "substantial similarity" analysis of: (1) "the beat" and the songs to determine whether the similarities between the two songs concern copyrightable parts of XOXO and whether a reasonable and properly instructed jury could conclude that there is substantial similarity.  The Court found that the use in both songs of "a common four-bar phrase" would not establish substantial similarity between them.  Additionally, comparing the songs holistically, the Court found that no reasonable jury could find the lyrics of XOXO substantially similar to XO.  Aside from thef act that both songs' lyrics use the letters X and O, "there is virtually nothing common to the two song's lyrics" (emphasis in original).  Moreover, the lryics of the two songs have no word in common, save ubiquitous words like "I," "you," your," "is," and "baby."  The themes were also different.  Next, as to the music, the Court listened to the two song and found litte, if anything, in common.  The Court, accordingly, dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

Copyright Case Properly Reinstated Against Church

Yesh Music v. Lakewood Church et al., No. 12-20520 [Doc. 00512341666] (5th Cir. filed 08/14/2013).

Plaintiff filed a copyright infringement complaint against Defendants in Texas.  Defendants are a large church and its pastors, Joel and Victoria Osteen.  Plaintiff had granted the church a limited license to use a song
in connection with various  marketing media.  When the church used the song in a televised promotional broadcast, Plaintiff asserted that the limited license did not permit use of the song on television and that in any case, the term of the license had expired. Unable to resolve their dispute, Plaintiff filed a copyright infringement suit against Defendants.

Plaintiffs it later voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice.  Plaintiff then filed an identical case in federal court in New York.  Back in Texas, the church has filed a motion for its costs and when the parties were before the Court on that matter, the parties agreed on the record to dismiss the New York action and re-instate the Texas action. Because under Rule 41(a)(1)(B), the two successive voluntary dismissals of the lawsuit had the effect of rendering the second dismissal as one with prejudice, Plaintiff filed a motion to vacate its voluntary dismissal under Rule 60(b), which the district court granted.  Defendant opposed, arguing that Rule 60(b) only applies to a "final" order or judgment, and the first voluntary dismissal was not "final."  The Fifth Circuit found that a voluntary dismissal without prejudice is a “final proceeding” under Rule 60(b) and the district court did not abuse its discretion in reinstating the case.