Infringement Claim Dismissed In Country Music Spat Because No "Access"

Arnett v. Jackson, No. 5:16-cv-00872-D (E.D.N.C. Aug. 14, 2017) [Doc. 28].

A songwriter who claimed that his song "Remember Me" was infringed by country music star Alan Jackson's song "Remember When" had his copyright infringement claim dismissed under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to plausibly allege the defendant's access to the plaintiff's song.  The Plaintiff argued that Jackson had access to Remember Me because it was widely disseminated and sent to third-party intermediaries who knew Jackson.  But, the Court found that the fact that the plaintiff's song was available on the internet and that plaintiff had sold the song (without an allegation of commercial success) did not create an inference of access.  Further, the connections between the alleged third-party intermediaries was not close enough, and the plaintiff did not sufficiently allege how the songs were sufficiently similar in order to assume access.

Claims Against Beyoncé For Sampled Clips for “Formation” Survive, Despite Assertion of Fair Use

Estate of Barré et al. v. Carter et al., No. 2:17-cv-01057 (U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana July 26, 2017)

A Louisiana federal judge refused to dismiss a copyright lawsuit against Beyoncé claiming she illegally sampled YouTube clips in her music video for “Formation.” The judge determined that Beyoncé’s use of the deceased YouTube star, Anthony Barré’s audio, would likely fail the four-factor fair use test. The Judge stated that Beyoncé’s use of Barré’s work was “highly commercial” and copied “the heart” of the original work, both weighing against a finding of fair use.  Barré’s estate had presented “sufficient facts at this stage of litigation to show that the four-factor fair use test could ultimately weigh against a finding of fair use.”

Copyright Suit Dismissed Against Beatles Company

Sid Bernstein Presents LLC v. Apple Corps Ltd. et al., No. 1:16-cv-07084 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2017)

The Court dismissed a copyright suit against the Beatles' Apple Corp. company, determining that Sid Bernstein Presents LLC – the company that currently owns intellectual property rights of a promoter who is credited with bringing The Beatles to the U.S. – did not have rights over footage from the band’s 1965 concert at Shea Stadium. The complaint alleged that Sid Bernstein Presents LLC retained copyrights to the footage and that The Beatles Company had infringed their copyright by allowing it to be used in Ron Howard’s “Eight Days a Week.” After reading through the contracts, the Judge determined that the language makes an admission that Sid Bernstein was not involved in the filming of the concert and was not the “author” of the footage for the purposes of copyright law.

Copyright Ownership Claims Time-Barred For Songs Recently Sampled In Popular Songs

Wilson v. Dynatone Publishing, No. 16-cv-104 (S.D.N.Y. April 10, 2017).

For two songs from the 1970s that were recently sampled in popular songs, Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment judgment that they are the copyright owners of the sampled songs and that the defendants' copyrights are invalid, and Plaintiffs also sought an accounting.  The Court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).

The Court found that the copyright ownership claims were untimely and barred by the statute of limitations.  The claims accrued in the early 1970s.  The accounting claims, in addition to an absence of allegations of a fiduciary relationship, also were time-barred.

Marshall Tucker Band TM Action Dismissed Because Mark Not Used In Commerce

Marshall Tucker Band v. MT Industries, No. 16-420 (D. S.C. Mar. 1, 2017).

In an action by the Marshall Tucker Band alleging trademark infringement, dilution, declaratory judgment, and trademark cancellation under federal law and a host of state-law claims, the Court granted the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss because the complaint failed to allege that the defendant actually uses the mark in commerce.  Instead, the complaint relied upon statements made by the defendant  when it applied to register two federal trademarks consisting of the mark (The Marshall Tucker Band) to satisfy the use in commerce requirement.  The Court held: "Completely absent from the SAC are any allegations of Defendants’ actual use of the Mark in commerce. Inasmuch as registration of the Mark, without more, is insufficient to constitute a use in commerce, Plaintiffs’ federal trademark infringement claim fails as a matter of law."  The trademark dilution claim was dismissed for the same reason, and the Court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.

Blues Musician's Sampling Case Dismissed For Lack Of Jurisdiction In Illinois

Johnson v. Barrier et al., No. 15-3928 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2017).

The Court granted defendant's Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to refiling in another jurisdiction.  Plaintiff is a blues musician who alleges UMG and others intentionally misappropriated his song by sampling it in another group of songs (the "Juice Products").  After granting plaintiff limited jurisdictional discovery, the federal Court found that it did not have specific or general jurisdiction over the defendants under Illinois law.  The Court observed that " UMG’s wholesale shipments and sales of Juice Products within Illinois constituted only 1% of its total wholesale figures, and—as UMG’s corporate designee testified—none of the marketing associated with the Juice Products was specific to or otherwise targeted Illinois."  Having dismissed on jurisdictional grounds, the Court did not decide the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.

"We Shall Overcome" Putative Class Action Survives Dismissal

We Shall Overcome Foundation v. Richmond Org., No. 16-2725 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2016).

In a putative class action challenging the Defendants' copyright in the song "We Shall Overcome" on the basis that the lyrics of the first verse is virtually indistinguishable from a song in the public domain, the Court denied the defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the copyright claims, but did dismiss the state-law claims as pre-empted.  The Court found that the plaintiffs had plausibly alleged: (1) that the first verse in the copyrighted work “We Shall Overcome” lacks originality (thereby rebutting the certificate of registration); (2) fraud on the copyright office by deliberately omitting from their application for a copyright in a derivative work all reference to the public domain spiritual or the publications of “I Shall Overcome” and “We Shall Overcome” as antecedents to the Song; and (3) divestment of copyright protection, under the 1909 Act, by publishing the work without including notice of copyright.  However, the state-law claims were dismissed as pre-empted (Those claims are for money had and received, violation of New York General Business Law § 349, breach of contract, and rescission for failure of consideration).

Court Explains Prior Dismissal of Copyright Claim Concerning Beyonce's LEMONADE Trailer

Fulkes v. Knowles-Carter et al., No. 16-4278 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 12, 2016).

Having previously granted the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for copyright infringement by "bottom-line order," the Court explained the reasons for its ruling.  In this case, the plaintiff alleged that defendants' distribution of a film trailer and the film itself promoting the release of Beyonce's musical album "Lemonade" infringed plaintiff's copyright in the short film "Palinoia." 

On a Rule 12 motion, the Court noted that the works themselves control, not Plaintiff's descriptions in the pleadings, and decided that the works were not substantially similar as a matter of law.  In short, "Plaintiff's alleged similarities consist almost entirely of clearly defined ideas not original to plaintiff and of stock elements with which even a casual observer would be familiar. Moreover, to the very limited extent that there are even any superficial similarities, these are overwhelmed by the works' vastly different creative choices and overall aesthetic feel. "  The Court then went through each of the 9 allegedly similar scenes.

Jeremih Can't Avoid Photog's Secondary Copyright Infringement Claims & Model's Publicity Claim Over Album Cover

Rams v. Def Jam Recordings, No. 15-8671 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2016).

Artist Jeremih's Rule 12 motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' secondary copyright infringement claim, and all of the Defendants' motion to dismiss the right of publicity claim under California law, were denied.  The case involves the use of a photo on an album cover on the hit single "Don't Tell 'Em"; the plaintiff photographer alleged copyright infringement against the artist and label, and the plaintiff model alleged violation of her right of publicity.

As to the contributory infringement claim against the defendant artist, the Court held that the photographer stated a claim.  "Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, it is plausible that ... the recording artist, whose work is distributed by UMG under the Def Jam label, would have reason to know of the infringing use of the Subject Image on his own album cover."

As to the vicarious infringement claim against the defendant artist, again the Court held that the photographer stated a claim.  "Plaintiffs state a plausible claim that, as a recording artist...[he] had the right and ability to supervise the selection of cover artwork for his own 'Don't Tell 'Em' single."  Further, the Court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged that the artist benefited financially from the infringement.

As to the model's right of publicity claim, the Court first addressed whether the law of Denmark applied (where the model resides) or whether instead California law applies.  California's choice of law rules applied because the case had been transferred to New York from California district court.  Accordingly, the Court applied the "governmental interest" test under California law, and held that California law should apply.  "Under California law, Rams has sufficiently alleged that Defendants knowingly distributed and profited from the use of her image throughout California without her consent, violating her right of publicity."

1st Amend. Protects Kanye's Film Name from Trademark Claims

Medina v. Dash Films et al., No. 15-2551 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2016).

In a trademark infringement action against Kanye West and related parties over use of the title "LOISAIDAS" for various films, the Court dismissed (under Rule 12(b)(6)) the complaint of the owner of the trademark LOISAIDAS for rap-names based on the First Amendment right to artistic expression.  Because the term at issue is the title of an artistic work, the Court first asks whether the title has any artistic relevance to the work whatsoever and then, if it does, whether the application of the relevant factors indicates a particularly compelling likelihood of confusion that renders the title explicitly misleading. 

The title “Loisaidas” clearly has artistic relevance to a series of short films about drug dealers seeking to acquire control of the drug trade in Manhattan’s Lower East Side. As noted in the attachments to plaintiff’s complaint, “Loisaidas …. is the Spanish slang term for ‘lower east siders.’” (SAC Exh. B.) The characters repeatedly refer to people and places “downtown in Loisaidas” (Ep. 3, 2:30), and scenes are identifiably set in the Lower East Side (see, e.g., Ep. 2, 0:59 (character bikes past Katz’s Deli)). The copyrighted term was “not arbitrarily chosen just to exploit the publicity value of [plaintiff’s music duo] but instead ha[s] genuine relevance to the film’s story.” Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001. 

Next, the Court found that the title was not explicitly misleading.  The term was not a source denoter.  In conclusion:

Consideration of plaintiff’s complaint and the expressive work that prompted it permits only one conclusion: that the work is a film, and that its title is artistically relevant to its content and not explicitly misleading as to any association with plaintiff’s music duo. Given the First Amendment values at interest, the Lanham Act and its state law counterparts have been and must be construed not to reach such expression. 

Cruz Campaign Can't Avoid Copyright Infringement & Contract Claims

Leopona, Inc. et al. v. Cruz for President, No. 00658-2016 (W.D. Wash. July 11, 2016).

In a case involving former presidential candidate Ted Cruz's use of two licensed songs in YouTube videos supporting his campaign, the Court denied Cruz's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' copyright infringement and breach of contract claims.  The breach of contract claim, which included a $25,000 liquidated damages provision, arose out of a license agreement that restricted use of the licensed song for political purposes.  The court held that the licensor's claim was not pre-empted by section 301 of the Copyright Act because the licensor was not the copyright owner (it was a distribution and licensing service), and the actual copyright owners (the song's authors) had not brought breach of contract claims -- they had brought only copyright infringement claims.  Lastly, on the claim for an injunction, the Court held that it was not moot due to suspension of the Cruz campaign because the YouTube videos were still available online.

Pre-1972 Copyright Claims Limited By 3, Not 6, Year Limitation Period

ABS Entm't, Inc. v. CBS, No. 15-cv-6801 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2016).

New York's 3 year statute of limitations "for an injury to property" applies to plaintiffs' claims for common law copyright infringement of pre-1972 sound recordings, holds the Court, not the State's 6-year "catch-all" provision.  CPLR 213(1) and 214(4).  Plaintiffs, a putative class, allege that CBS violated the public performance rights of pre-1972 sound recordings as protected under New York common law, and allege common law infringement and unfair competition.  The narrow issue before the Court was whether a 3 or 6 year limitations period applied, and Judge Koetel held that the plain meaning of "property" (as used in the 3 year statute) is broad enough to encompass intangible property, like intellectual property in the form of sound recordings (or trade secrets).  In other words, the 3 year limitations period is not limited to tangible property.  Notably, the Court recognized that "the case law is mixed" on this question, addressing both the Flo & Eddie [80 F. Supp. 3d 535 , 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)] and Harrison [44 Misc. 3d 428 , 986 N.Y.S.2d 837 , 838 (Sup. Ct. 2014)] cases.

Village People Claims Dismissed On Res Judicata Grounds

Willis v. Scorpio Music, No. 15-cv-1078 (S.D. Cal. order dated Jan. 19, 2016).

In a second lawsuit concerning ownership of various "Village People" compositions, the district court dismissed a 50% owner's claims based on defendant's false claim of authorship, breach of fiduciary duty, and vicarious copyright infringement.  As to the false ownership claims, the Court held that plaintiff was barred by the doctrine of res judicata from brining claims that he could have brought in the earlier action.  As to the vicarous copyright infringement claim, the court held that the defendant had the right to license the composition and thus there was no infringement.  Lastly, the court held that co-owners of a copyright -- though they have a duty to account -- do not have fiduciary duties to one another.

Chorus In Bieber & Usher Song Similar Enough To Chorus In Plaintiff's Song To State Copyright Claim

Copeland v. Bieber, No. 14-1427 (4th Cir. June 18, 2015)

The Fourt Circuit vacated the trial Court's dimissal of Plaintiff's claim against Justin Bieber and other defendants alleging that three recorded songs infringe upon plaintiff's copyright in an earlier song of the same name.  Applying the "intrinsic similarity" test -- whether the songs at issue, assessed from the perspective of the intended audience (the general public), and taking into account their "total concept and feel" -- the appellate court found on de novo review, after listening to both songs start to finish, that plaintiff stated a claim.  First, the court found that the three songs (a demo, album version, and remix) were "the same" (not just substantially similar) under the unscientific intrisic standard.  Second, the court compared the three songs to plaintiff's song.  The appellate court disagreed with the lower court's finding that there was a different overall "aesthetic appeal," finding too much of a focus on the mood and tone of the song rather than the similarities between the most imporant "element" of the songs, their choruses.  The songs are different genres, but that is not enough (the Court gave the example of the Beatles' songbook being turned into an unlicensed reggae or heavy metal version).  Further, the songs were in may respects dissimilar; numerically, the points of dissimilarity may have exceeded the points of similarity.  "But what that analysis fails to account for...is the relative importances of these differences as compared to what the songs reasonably could be heard to have in common: their choruses....courts routinely permit a finding of substantial similarity where the works share some espeically significant sequence of notes or lyrics."  Continguing, "we think it is clear that when it comes to popular music, a song's chorus may be the kind of key sequence that can give rise to intrinsic similarity, even when works differ in other respects."  In other words, "the hook" is key.  And whether a member of the general public could experience these songs primarily through their choruses and thus find them substantially similar is a close enough question that it cannot be disposed of as a matter of law and should instead by decided by a jury.

[Author's note: missed this case earlier in the year].

Record Company Copyright Claims Against Amway Survive Dismissal

Alticor Inc. v. UMG  Recordings, Inc., No. 6:14-cv-542 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 10, 2015).

In a complex dispute between mutliple record companies and Amway concerning alleged direct, vicarious and contributory infringement of pre- and post-'72 sound recordings in over 1,000 videos, the Court dismissed Amway's Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the record companies counter-claims.  First, the Court found that the record companies had adequately alleged violations of their exclusive right of public performance.  Amway argued that the "public performance right" applicable to musical compositions and other works was inapplicable to sound recordings; the Court rejected that argument.  Second, the Court found that even though the Copyright Act does not conver a "making available" right, the act of making a work available for use of a direct infringer was relevant to the record companies' indirect infringement claims.  Third, the Court agreed with Amway that Florida common law does not create a public performance right for pre-72 recordings, but nonetheless held that it would not grant Amway partial relief under Rule 12(b)(6).

Sampling Case Against B.I.G. Dismissed

Hutson v. Notorious B.I.G., LLC et al., No. 14-cv-2307-RJS (SDNY Dec. 22, 2015) [Doc. 51].

On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court dismissed plaintiff Lee Hutson's copyright infringement claims against the Notorious B.I.G.'s successor, label, publisher, record company and distributor, which alleged unauthorized sampling of Plaintiff's 1973 song (composition and sound recording) "Can't Say Enough About Mom" in the Biggie song "The What" appearing on the 1994 album "Ready To Die."  Plaintiff alleged that he first discovered the unauthorized sample in 2012, and brought suit in 2014.  In his amended complaint, plaintiff alleged infringement of the composition, of the sound recording outside the USA, and the digital performance right of the sound recording.

The Court dismissed each claim.  After noting the standard on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, and discussing which documents outside of the pleadings it would consider (e.g., agreements, the sound recording, copyright registrations, certificates of incorporation), the Court then turned to each cause of action.

First, the Court found that Plaintiff lacked standing.  Although Plaintiff alleged that he owned 50% of the copyright in the composition, the Court found that allegation implausible for the time of the infringement (1994-the present) because the agreements submitted did not establish that he had a chain of title, and further, the allegation that plaintiff was "doing business as" a certain entity was insufficient given corporate formalities.  [The Court did note in dicta, fn. 4, that the statute of limitations defense likely failed.]  Similarly the Court found that Plaintiff failed to plead ownership of the sound recording because of a a prior lawsuit in which the settlement included an assignment to the record label as well as a release.

Second, the Court found that it lacked jurisdiction over infringement occurring abroad.

Accordingly, the Court dismissed the claims.  The Court even dismissed claims against a non-moving defendant.

Lastly, the Court denied Plaintiff's application for leave to amend, as futile.

Pro Se Plaintiff's Taylor Swift Case Dismissed At In Forma Pauperis Stage

Braham v. Sony/ATV Music Publishing et al., 15-cv-8422 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 10, 2015).

A magistrate judge denied the pro se plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis on the basis that he failed to state a claim against Taylor Swift and her label/publisher for alleged copyright infringement.  According to the Complaint, defendants used a 22 word phrase from Plaintiff's song "Haters gone hate".  Without ident ifying the specific phrase, Plaintiff alleges that “92% of the lyrics” of “Shake It Off” come from his song, that his “song phrase string is used over 70+ times,” and that Taylor Swift would not have written “Shake It Off” had he not written “Haters gone hate.”  The Court found that the plaintiff failed to adequately allege copying under Rule 8.  The Court further noted that if the plaintiff chose to refile an amended complaint, it had significant concerns that he lacked a claim based solely on the lyrics.  Moreover, the plaintiff would need to allege that his lyrics are original.

Beyonce Dodges Copyright Claim In "XO" v "XOXO" Case

Lane v. Carter et al., No. 14-cv-6798 (SDNY filed 10/21/15) [Doc. 51].

Plaintiff's claim, alleging that he gave a copy of his song XOXO to one of Beyonce's background singers and that Beyonce infringed the song when she created the song XO, was dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and 8(a).  First, the Court found that although Plaintiff holds a copyright registration for the lyrics to XOXO, the registration excluded rights to the music which was the sole basis of the copyright claim.  Moreover, even though Plaintiff alleged that he was an exclusive licensee, he did not allege that hte licensor had a valdily registred copyright.  Accordingly, the claim was dismissed for lack of standing. 

Even though that was potentially curable on an amended pleading, the Court found then considered whether a copyright infringement claim was otherwise substantively viable.  The Court then underwent a "substantial similarity" analysis of: (1) "the beat" and the songs to determine whether the similarities between the two songs concern copyrightable parts of XOXO and whether a reasonable and properly instructed jury could conclude that there is substantial similarity.  The Court found that the use in both songs of "a common four-bar phrase" would not establish substantial similarity between them.  Additionally, comparing the songs holistically, the Court found that no reasonable jury could find the lyrics of XOXO substantially similar to XO.  Aside from thef act that both songs' lyrics use the letters X and O, "there is virtually nothing common to the two song's lyrics" (emphasis in original).  Moreover, the lryics of the two songs have no word in common, save ubiquitous words like "I," "you," your," "is," and "baby."  The themes were also different.  Next, as to the music, the Court listened to the two song and found litte, if anything, in common.  The Court, accordingly, dismissed the complaint with prejudice.

Kanye, Jay-Z and Others Avoid Copyright Infringement Claim Because Two "Made In America" Songs Not Substantially Similar

McDonald v. West et al., No. 14-cv-8794 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2015) [Doc. 42].

In case about two songs both called "Made In America," the Court dismissed the Complaint against Kanye West, Jay-Z and others alleging copyright infringement of the plaintiff's song, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  First, the Court found that even though the two songs shared the same title, the song title "Made In America" was not copyrightable.  "It is too brief, common, and unoriginal to create any exclusive right."  Second, the Court analyzed similarity between the lyrics in the chorus of each song, along with alleged musical similarity.  However, the Court found that plaintiff did not plausibly plead substantial similarity.  The Court then turned to a "holistic" comparison of the two songs, because even if the indvidual elements that make up Plaintiff's songs are uncopyrightable, they still may represent a protected selection and arrangement of unprotectable elements.  The Court found that no reasonable jury could find the two songs similar, lyrically or musically.  The differences were major.  "Where any reasonable juror would conclude - as here - that the differences are many, and what similarities exist are based on unprotectable elements, the two works are not substantially similar as a matter of law."  Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint.

Court Has Jurisdiction Over King Of Pop's Executors In Photo Shoot Case, But Plaintiff's Counsel Disqualified As A Witness

Noval Williams Films v. Branc, 14-cv-4711 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 3, 2015) [Doc. 43].

In a case where Plaintiff film matker sought a declaratory judgment against Michael Jackson's estate that it did not infringe the copyrights in certain audivisual and photographic materials by using them in a documentary film, the Court denied Michael Jackson's executor's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, or alternatively to transfer to California federal court.  However, the executor's motion disqualify plaintiff's counsel was granted because he is a material witness.