Kanye, Jay-Z and Others Avoid Copyright Infringement Claim Because Two "Made In America" Songs Not Substantially Similar

McDonald v. West et al., No. 14-cv-8794 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 30, 2015) [Doc. 42].

In case about two songs both called "Made In America," the Court dismissed the Complaint against Kanye West, Jay-Z and others alleging copyright infringement of the plaintiff's song, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).  First, the Court found that even though the two songs shared the same title, the song title "Made In America" was not copyrightable.  "It is too brief, common, and unoriginal to create any exclusive right."  Second, the Court analyzed similarity between the lyrics in the chorus of each song, along with alleged musical similarity.  However, the Court found that plaintiff did not plausibly plead substantial similarity.  The Court then turned to a "holistic" comparison of the two songs, because even if the indvidual elements that make up Plaintiff's songs are uncopyrightable, they still may represent a protected selection and arrangement of unprotectable elements.  The Court found that no reasonable jury could find the two songs similar, lyrically or musically.  The differences were major.  "Where any reasonable juror would conclude - as here - that the differences are many, and what similarities exist are based on unprotectable elements, the two works are not substantially similar as a matter of law."  Accordingly, the Court dismissed the complaint.

Fraudulent DMCA Take-Down Notice May Be Basis For Claim If iTunes Stores Music At Direction Of A User

Distribuidora De Discos Karen, C por A. v. Seijas, No. 13 Civ. 5200 (NRB), 2015 BL 93133 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2015).

Denying defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court held that: (1) a misrepresentation claim under the DMCA may be predicated on a technically defective take-down notice; (2) a misrepresentation claim under the DMCA must be predicated on a take-down notice that is not directed towards activity that the DMCA protects; and (3) it was premature to decide whether Apple stores music on iTunes "at the Direction of a User."  Accordingly, a notice sent by Defendants to iTunes stating that certain recordings had not been licensed for distribution can be the subject of a misrepresentation claim under the DMCA even if it did not meet all the statutory requirements for such a notice, but, such a claim could only apply if the notice was “directed at ‘storage at the direction of a user,' ” which might or might not have been true in the instant case.

Here, defendants and plaintiffs disputed who owned certain publishing and sound recording rights.  The artists' counsel sent Apple a take-down notice, saying that “no license has been issued” with respect to the recordings.  Apple then dropped the subject recordings from iTunes, and plaintiffs sued, alleging misrepresentation under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C. § 512(f).  The DMCA creates a notice-and-takedown procedure for allegedly infringing copies of works posted online, and subsection (f) creates a cause of action for sending fraudulent takedown notices.  Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim.  The Court found that the communication to Apple “was not so deficient as to fall outside the reach of subsection 512(f).”  But, the remaining issue was whether iTunes falls within the section 512(c) safe-harbor, to wit: "whether Apple stores music on iTunes 'at the direction of a user,' 17 U.S.C. § 512(c) (1)".  The Court found that "the complaint simply does not state enough facts about iTunes for us to say what happens behind the scenes, so we cannot decide at the present stage whether iTunes stores music at the direction of users."  Accordingly, the motion to dismiss was denied.

State-Law Copyright And Unfair Competition Claims Relating To In-Flight Music Services Not Preempted

UMG Recordings v. Global Eagle Entertainment, No. 14-03466 MMM (C.D. Cal. dated Feb. 23, 2015).

The Court denied defendant airline's motion to dismiss claims for copyright infringement under California law, along with California unfair competition claims, finding that even if in-flight entertainment qualifies as a service as that term is used in the Airline Deregulation Act, any connection between the service and plaintiffs' claims was too tenuous and remote to justify preemption.

Plaintiffs were various record companies and music publishers.  They contended that defendants provided “various airlines” sound recordings and music videos that the airlines then publicly perform to their passengers.  Defendants contended that the court should dismiss the record company plaintiffs’ state law copyright infringement and unfair competition claims because the claims were preempted by the Deregulation Act.  Congress enacted the Deregulation Act in 1978 after determining that maximum reliance on competitive market forces would best further efficiency, innovation, and low prices as well as variety and quality of air transportation services."

Wyclef Escapes Infringement Claim Because "Actual Sounds" Not Copied

Pryor v. Jean, No. CV 13-02867, 2014 BL 283332 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 08, 2014) [Doc. 36].

Plaintiff, who claimed that his 1970's song "Bumpin' Bus Stop" was infringed by the defendants use of a sample in the Wyclef Jean song "Step Up" recorded in 2006, had his copyright infringement case dismissed.  The issue was that Plaintiff's song had appeared on two albums.  The song first appeared on a recording referred to as the "Gold Future" record.  Later, the Gold Future record was remastered, shortened in duration, and Plaintiff's band name was changed.  The latter record was referred to as the "Private Stock" record.  Years later, Defendants licensed the song from the Private Stock record.

The existence of two separate sound recordings (the Gold Future record and the Private Stock remaster) was important, as the substantive allegations at issue referred only to copyright to the Gold Future record, and not to the "Bumpin' Bus Stop" musical composition featured in both the Gold Future record and the Private Stock record.  The Court found: "Under 17 U.S.C. § 114(b), Plaintiffs have the exclusive right to duplicate, rearrange, or remix the 'actual sounds' of the Gold Future record. Defendants did not do anything with those 'actual sounds.'  Rather, Defendants used licensed 'actual sounds' from the Private Stock record.  Because the TAC's First and Second claims for relief are premised solely upon infringement of the Gold Future sound recording copyright, those claims are DISMISSED, with prejudice."

Publisher Not Liable For Contributory Liability In Sampling Case Because Lacked Knowledge

Prior v. Warner/Chappel, No. 13-4344 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 20, 2014).

The court dismissed plaintiff's contributory copyright infringement claim against defendant music publisher because the complaint failed to allege the defendant "knew or had reason to know that [the song] included an unauthorized, infringing sample...".  Moreover, the complaint failed to plausibly allege how the defendant knew that the directly infringing defendants would infringe as a result of the publisher's licensing of the song.

Country Music Infringement Claim Survives Dismissal

Bowen v. Paisley et al., No. 3:13-cv-0414 (M.D. Tenn. filed Dec. 3, 2013) [Doc. 58]

Plaintiff alleged that the defendants, including popular country music singers Brad Paisley and Carrie
Underwood, violated her copyright interests in the song “Remind Me,” a song that plaintiff
copyrighted and recorded.  Defendants moved to dismiss.  The Court denied defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding that under the Iqbal standard, plaintiff had plausibly shown that, taken in combination, her lyrics and associated melodies, intonations, and usage could be sufficiently original to constitute protectable material, and that based on the Court's own comparison of the two works that defendants' hooks which incorporate that potentially distinctive combination of elements, are “substantially similar”.

Beastie Boys Avoid Several Copyright Claims In Sampling Case

TufAmerica, Inc. v. Diamond et al., No. 12-cv-3529-AJN (S.D.N.Y. filed Sep. 10, 2013).

Plaintiff brought a copyright infringement action against the Beastie Boys alleging unlawful sampling of 6 pieces of plaintiff's music in five Beastie Boys songs that appear on two Beastie Boys albums (Paul's Boutique and Licensed to Ill).  Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).

The Court agreed with plaintiff that the standard for determining substantial similarity was "fragmented literal similarity", rather than "ordinary observer" standard.  Under the "fragmented literal similarity" standard, the question was whether the copying went to trivial or substantive elements.  Thus, the "real question" for the Court was whether Plaintiff had alleged that each sample was "quantitatively and qualitatively important to the original work such that the fragmented similarity becomes sufficiently substantial for the use to become an infringement."  Under the quantitative analysis, the concept of de minimis copying is relevant.  Also, the analysis is of the original song -- not of the use in the allegedly infringing song; therefore, the Court was not persuaded by Plaintiff's allegation in its original complaint that the samples were concealed to a casual listener of the Beastie Boys' songs.  Thus, the Court then went on a song-by-song analysis, which included a discussion of whether the sampled portion was even copyrightable material, and dismissed four of the claims based on 4 of the samples.  Lastly, under the statute of limitations, the Court also limited the surviving claims to infringements occurring after May 2009 (3 years before the suit was filed).

Plaintiff in Roc Logo Case Granted Leave To Amend

Walker v. Carter et al., No. 1:12-cv-05384-ALC-RLE (S.D.N.Y. filed 08/14/13) (Doc. 58).

Plaintiff alleged that defendants (Jay-Z, his record label(s) and business partners) entered into an oral contract with Plaintiff in 1995 under which Plaintiff was to re-design the logo for the Roc-A-Fella record label in exchange for: (i) $3,500 up-front, and (ii) 2% of all revenues from products bearing the logo for the next ten years.  The moving defendants argued that Plaintiff failed to state a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) because none of them had any dealings with plaintiff.  In opposition, Plaintiff requested leave to amend the complaint.  The Court denied the motions without prejudice and granted Plaintiff leave to amend (but was cautioned about requesting leave to amend again).

7th Cir. Affirms Dismissal of "Nikita"/"Natasha" Suit Against Elton John

Hobbs v. Elton John, No. 12-3652 (7th Cir. July 17, 2013).

Plaintiff composed a song entitled “Natasha” that was inspired by a brief love affair he had with a Russian waitress.  Plaintiff tried to publish  his song, but was unsuccessful. A few years later, Elton John and Bernie Taupin released a song entitled “Nikita” through a publishing company to which Plaintiff had sent a copy of “Natasha.” Believing that “Nikita” was based upon “Natasha,” Plaintiff eventually demanded compensation
from John and Taupin, and ultimately filed suit asserting a copyright infringement claim and two related state law claims. The defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim, and the district court granted the defendants’ motion.  The 7th Circuit affirmed.

The Court held that Plaintiff failed to state a claim for copyright infringement because, even when the allegedly similar elements between the songs are considered in combination, the songs are not substantially similar.  Defendants conceded that Plaintiff owned a valid copyright in the song and that Defendants had access to it.  "Thus, the defendants can only prevail on their motion to dismiss if 'Natasha' and 'Nikita'
are not 'substantially similar' as a matter of law. That is, if as a matter of law 'Natasha' and 'Nikita' do not 'share enough unique features to give rise to a breach of the duty not to copy another’s work'."  The Court found that Plaintiff's argument "flounders on two well-established principles of copyright law."  First, that the Copyright Act does not protect general ideas, but only the particular expression of an idea.  And second, even at the level of particular expression, the Copyright Act does not protect “incidents, characters or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable, or at least standard, in the treatment of a given topic.” A careful review of both songs’ lyrics reveals that Plaintiff's first four allegedly similar elements are expressed differently in “Natasha” and “Nikita.” And the remaining similar elements are rudimentary, commonplace, standard, or unavoidable in popular love songs.  The two songs simply “tell different stories."

Because “Natasha” and “Nikita” are not “substantially similar” as a matter of law, Plaintiff's copyright infringement claim failed as a matter of law.

Gaga Dismissed From Copyright Case Because Indemnification And Contribution Not Available

Gaines v. Fusari, No. 2:11-cv-04433-WJM-MF (D.N.J. filed 05/08/13) [Doc. 85].

The Court granted third-party defendant Lady Gaga's motion to dismiss the third-party complaint.  Gaga and defendant co-own the copyright to a number of songs.  Plaintiff brought the action seeking a declaration that he is a co-author and co-producer of the songs.  After Plaintiff sued defendant, defendant brought third-party claims for indemnification and contribution against Gaga.  The Court found:

Fusari’s indemnification and contribution claims against Germanotta must be grounded in federal law. But neither federal statutory law nor federal common law provide causes of action for indemnification or contribution in Copyright Act cases. See, e.g., Pure Country Weavers, Inc. v. Bristar, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 2d 439, 448 (W.D.N.C. 2006) (no cause of action for indemnification in Copyright case); Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea World, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 411, 416 (D.N.J. 2005) (no cause of action for contribution in Copyright case). Accordingly, the Court will DISMISS Counts I and II WITH PREJUDICE.

No Infringement Of Plot

Bolfrass v Warner Music Group, No. 1:12-cv-06648-LLS (S.D.N.Y. filed 04/02/2013) [Doc. 13].

Plaintiff alleged that a song published by defendant Warner Music ("Warner") infringed his copyright on his screenplay, in violation of the Copyright Act of 1976.  Warner moved to dismiss and for attorneys fees.  Warner's motion to dismiss was granted and its application for the award of attorney's s and costs was denied.

First, the Court examined whether Plaintiff's "plot" was afforded copyright protection.  The Court found that "the similarity two works here lies in their concepts, abstracted to a high degree of generality. Both are based on a concept of planetary breakdown and space travel, but their treatment is very different."  It concluded that "Because the lyrics of "Exogenesis: Symphony" do not express a plot, they do not infringe on "Panspermia: ExoGenesis."  The online liner notes a plot, but one that is far too abstract and general to infringe on Bollfrass' copyright."  Accordingly, the copyright claim was dismissed.

Second, the Court examined Plaintiff's claim for unfair competition, and found that it was preempted by the Copyright Act.  "Bollfrass' claim for unfair competition based only on Jarner's distribution of the allegedly
infringing song is therefore preempted by the Copyright Act.".

Third, the Court examined Warner's request for attorneys fees.  Ultimately, the request was denied on a "close call."

3d Cir. Affirms Dismissal of Author's Suit Against 50 Cent

Winstead v. Jackson, No. 11-3771 (3d Cir. opinion filed Jan. 11, 2013).

The Third Circuit affirmed an order of the District Court dismissing the amended complaint as to all defendants.  In this copyright case, the parties respective works at issue include Plaintiff's book, The Preacher’s Son – But the Streets Turned Me into a Gangster, and defendant Curtis Jackson's (50 Cent's) Before I Self-Destruct album/CD, featuring songs and lyrics written by Jackson; and his companion film of the same name, which Jackson wrote, starred in, and directed.  Jackson and the record companies moved to dismiss the amended complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(b)(6), arguing that the copyright infringement claim failed because Plaintiff's book and Jackson's album/CD and film are not substantially similar as a matter of law, and that Plaintiff's state law claims are preempted by the Copyright Act because they are premised on the same underlying facts.  The Circuit Court affirmed dismissal, finding inter alia:

We agree with the District Court that a lay observer would not believe that Jackson's album/CD and film copied protectable aspects of [Plaintiff]'s book.
***
There was a failure to state an actionable claim for copyright infringement here because, although [Plaintiff]'s book and Jackson's works share similar themes and setting, the story of an angry and wronged protagonist who turns to a life of violence and crime has long been a part of the public domain.

***
In addition, [Plaintiff]'s book and Jackson's works are different with respect to character, plot, mood, and sequence of events.

***

[Plaintiff] contends that direct phrases from his book appear in Jackson's film. ... The average person reading or listening to these phrases in the context of an overall story or song would not regard them as unique and protectable. ... Moreover, words and short phrases do not enjoy copyright protection.

Toto's Royalty Suit Against Sony Limited By Magistrate

Toto, Inc. v. Sony Music Entertainment, No. 12-cv-1434-LAK-AJP (SDNY report and recommendation Dec. 11, 2012).

Plaintiff Toto brought the action against Sony Music based on a dispute over the amount of royalties owed under the parties' recording contract.  Sony moved to dismiss, and the motion was granted in part and denied in part. The primary issue in the case ise the royalty rate for music distributed through download and mastertone providers (e.g., iTunes, eMusic, Amazon.com and Verizon Wireless).

The magistrate judge found that Toto's first claim based on royalty accountings for the audit period should be dismissed as contractually time barred.  The parties agreement had a 3 year limitation period (i.e., claims had to be brought within 3 years from the royalty report).  Toto's argument that August 2010 and December 2011 documentation restarted the time limitation was unavailing.  However, the magistrate judge found that the portion of Toto's first claim based on royalty accountings for the post-audit period should not be dismissed with respect to the digital download issue.  In other words, Toto stated a claim for breach of the recording contract for the period within the contractually agreed to 3 year limitation period.

The magistrate judge also found that Toto failed to plead the elements of equitable estoppel.  The Court held that purposefully delaying an audit was not a ground for invoking equitable estoppel.  Also, participation in settlement negotiations was not a ground for invoking equitable estoppel.

The magistrate judge also found that Toto's claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing should be dismissed.  The claim did not state a distinct cause of action based on a separate set of facts and was not independent of the breach of contract claim.  The good faith and fair dealing claim was duplicative of the breach of contract claim.

Distribution, Not Only Copying, Sufficient For Copyright Claim

Marshall v. Huffman, No. 10-1665 (N.D. Cal. filed Aug. 20, 2010) [Doc. 133].

This action concerns a song recorded by Mariah Carey, and claims against Carey and a music executive for unauthorized exploitation of Plaintiff's song.  Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiff failed adequately to allege his copyright claim, because plaintiff fails to allege that defendant “copied” plaintiff’s work, and because the allegation that Huffman “distributed” plaintiff’s copyrighted work without permission is insufficient to support the copyright infringement claim since it is devoid of supporting facts.  Defendant's was "not well taken."  The Court found that a claim for copyright infringement can be based on allegations of unauthorized distribution of a copyrighted work. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (exclusive rights protected by Copyright Act include right to distribution of copyrighted work). The complaint adequately explained the facts supporting the improper distribution allegations: it alleged that defendant distributed without permission plaintiff’s song “Are You the One,” in violation of the Copyright Act.  Motion to dismiss DENIED.

Common-Law Copyright Claim Time Barred; No Breach or Unjust Enrichment

Goeke v. Naxos of America, Inc., 650606/09, NYLJ 1202541596753, at *1 (Sup., NY, dec. Jan. 27, 2012) (Fried, J).

Plaintiff, a world-renowned lyric tenor, alleged that Defendants have been engaged in the unauthorized distribution and sale of five audio and audiovisual recordings of live opera and choral performances, in which plaintiff appeared as a featured artist. Plaintiff's cause of action for breach of contract against the defendant record distributor was dismissed because the label was not party to any contract with plaintiff. Plaintiff's causes of action for unjust enrichment against the defendant record distributor also was dismissed because there was no connection or relationship between the parties. Plaintiff's cause of action for common-law copyright infringement under New York law was dismissed because " the only judicially recognized relief in New York for the violation of such right are the protections afforded against the commercial misappropriation of a person's name, picture, or voice that are provided by Civil Rights Law §§50 and 51." This claim was dismissed under the applicable one-year limitations period. Additionally, Plaintiff's common law claim for unjust enrichment, based on the unauthorized appropriation of a name, picture, or voice, was subsumed under the time-barred Civil Rights Law §§50 and 51 claims.

Duke Ellington's Foreign Royalties Claim Dismissed Under Plain Language Of 1961 Contract

Ellington v. EMI Music Inc., 651558/2010, NYLJ 1202519466664 (printed Oct. 21, 2011), at *1 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. decided Oct. 2011).

This is action for breach of a songwriter royalty agreement, fraud, and a declaratory judgment. Defendant EMI moved to dismiss the complaint.

Plaintiff Paul M. Ellington, the heir and grandson of the legendary jazz composer and performer Edward Kennedy "Duke" Ellington, sought to recover foreign music publication royalties allegedly owed to him by defendants pursuant to contract dated December 17, 1961 (the 1961 contract). Ellington also sought to commence a class action against defendants on behalf of a putative class consisting of all persons to whom defendants have failed to pay their full contractual share of foreign publication royalties.

Pursuant to the 1961 contract, the First Parties transferred to the Second Party the copyrights to numerous identified musical compositions written by Duke Ellington between 1927 and the contract date, in exchange for, inter alia, payments of cash and royalties, calculated as a percentage of various sources of income, including income generated from sales outside the United States. The 1961 contract superceded a series of similar agreements between Duke Ellington and Mills Music or certain of its affiliates.

There was no real dispute that the 1961 contract is a "net receipts" songwriter royalty agreement. A "net receipts" agreement, common in the music industry prior to the early 1980s, provides for the payment of royalties to the songwriter on a net receipts basis, or, payment based on the net income received by the United States publisher from foreign subpublishers, who retain a percentage of the foreign income as a fee in payment for their services in exploiting and administering publication of the songs outside the United States.

The Court held that the 1961 Contract was clear and unambiguous. ""The royalty payment provision terms demonstrate that the 1961 contract is a net receipts royalty agreement that requires Mills Music, now EMI Mills, to pay Duke Ellington, now Ellington, one half of the 'net revenue actually received by the Second Party' from the 'foreign publication' of the songs falling within the scope of the contract." The Court rejected plaintiff's argument that the 1961 contract was a "at source" agreement, i.e., an agreement for payment of royalties earned worldwide calculated on the amount of income earned in the foreign territories at their source, rather than on the portion of that income received by the United States publisher. In sum, the 1961 contract permited defendants to employ the very method of royalty calculation of which Ellington now complains. Motion to dismiss granted.

Copyright Case Dismissed Against 50 Cent Over Crime Story/Book

Winstead v. Jackson, et al., No. 2:10-cv-05783 (D.N.J. Sept. 20, 2011) [Doc. 45].

In this copyright infringement action, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants’ movie and companion album, both entitled Before I Self Destruct, infringe upon Plaintiff’s copyright in his book, The Preachers Son - But the Streets Turned Me Into a Gangster. Plaintiff is the author and sole owner of the copyright for the Book. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants infringed upon the

copyright of the Book by publishing and selling the Movie and the Album, both of which

Plaintiff contends derive their content from the Book.

The Court granted defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff avers that the film duplicates the generalized theme and story

of the book and amounts to actionable copying. "However, general plot ideas and themes lie in

the public domain and are not protected by copyright law." Continuing:

There is no doubt that the Book and Film do share similar characters, themes, as well as a similar setting. However, this s haring of common features is only natural since both works feature a protagonist who has a difficult upbringing and turns to a life of violence and street crime, a story which has long ago been part of the public domain and which has been the subject of numerous movies and television shows. Thus, both works may properly contain gang life in inner-city New Jersey, characters spending time in jail, the search for an ex-girlfriend upon release from prison, making love in the shower, obtaining money through criminal activity, purchasing fancy clothes and accessories with the proceeds of crime, shoot-outs, murder, and the loss of a parent.

The Court further held that commonly used words, phrases and cliches used in both the book and movie/album are not protectable. Also, Plaintiff's state common law claims were pre-empted by the Copyright Act.

Lastly, because the Court held that Defendants did not infringe on Plaintiff’s copyright, Plaintiff’s claims of vicarious and contributory infringement fail since they hinge on a preliminary finding of direct infringement.

"Hey Micky!" Malpractice Action Survives Dismissal

Basilotta v. Warshavsky, 115524/09, NYLJ 1202511322101, at *1 (Sup.Ct., N.Y. Co., decided August 2, 2011)

The singer of the 1980's hit song that starts "Oh Micky you're so fine, you're so fine you blow my mind! Hey Mickey!" can proceed with her malpractice action against an attorney she claims failed to diligently protect her rights to the song. The Court found that the suit was not time barred.

Claims Dismissed In Aretha Contract Suit

BLD Productions, LLC v. Viacom, Inc., NYLJ 1202489492977, at *1 (SDNY, Decided March 31, 2011) (Gardephe, J.)

Summary: Plaintiff and defendant Viacom's affiliate negotiated a March 8, 2001, agreement for a benefit concert by Aretha Franklin. On April 10, 2001, Franklin granted plaintiff her rights to video and audio recordings of the concert. Despite the agreement's March 8, 2001, date and the concert's April performance, plaintiff claimed that the agreement was not finalized until 2006. Plaintiff alleged breaches of oral and written contract, and the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing, contending that Viacom and its affiliate failed to engage a distributor to make, market and distribute recordings of the concert, their failure to account for sales and revenues and to pay royalties to plaintiff.

Judge Gardephe dismissed the case against Viacom because it was not a party to the agreements, and plaintiff did not plead sufficient facts to pierce the corporate veil. Judge Gardephe also dismissed claims against Viacom's affiliate to the extent that plaintiff's breach of written contract claim were based on the affiliate's failure to provide master recordings to plaintiff. Plaintiff's claim that the agreement required the affiliate to secure a distributor was deemed time-barred by the New York statute of limitations. Judge Gardephe alsor dismissed plaintiff's claim for breach of an oral contract.

Napster Loses Indemnification Suit Against Label Over Mechanical Licenses

Napster LLC v Rounder Records Corp., No. 09-cv-00318 (S.D.N.Y. decided Jan. 25, 2011).

The dispute is over whether Rounder, a record label, is contractually obligated to indemnify Napster for costs incurred due to copyright infringement lawsuits brought by the owners of musical compositions embodied in the sound recordings provided by Rounder. Napster contends that under two contracts, Rounder was required to procure mechanical licenses for use of the infringed musical compositions.

The court dismissed Napster’s claim based on the first contract because the contract was rescinded by the second contract, thereby extinguishing any claim Napster might have had for its breach. The court dismissed Napster’s claim based on the second contract (i) for Napster's failure to comply with its advance consent provision concerning indemnification; and (ii) it was not Rounder’s responsibility to procure mechanical licenses for the infringing compositions under the contract.

Motion to dismiss granted.