Hip Hop Producer Failed To State A Claim Against Her Former Attorneys In An Earlier Copyright Action

Boone v. Codispoti & Assocs., No. 15-cv-01391 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 7, 2015).

The Court held that a hip-hop producer, proceeding pro se, did not state a claim for fraud, conspiracy and denial of due process arising from her former attorney's prior representation in a copyright infringement action.  Plaintiff alleged that her former attorneys falsely led her to believe that a jury trial would occur, and to amend her pleadings, knowing that almost all copyright infringement actions do not survive summary judgment.  The claim failed because the alleged statements were a mere expression of future expectations that did not constitute actionable fraud.  Moreover, the alleged actions were not fraudulent representations or omissions.  The claim was also time-barred.  Lacking a fraud claim, her conspiracy claim also failed.  The due process claim, under 42 USC 1983, failed because there was no statement of a constitutional violation.  The summary judgment decision dismissing her earlier case was affirmed on appeal.  Nor did defendants act under color of state law.  The defendants were private attorneys who represented plaintiff in federal court in a copyright action.  Leave to amend was denied, and the complaint was dismissed.

1st Cir Affirms $675,000 Jury Award For Unauthorized Downloads/Distributions

Sony BMG Music Entertainment v. Tenenbaum, No. Case: 12-2146 (1st Cir. filed 6/25/2013) [Doc. 00116547502].

From the decision:

Joel Tenenbaum illegally downloaded and distributed music for several years. A group of recording companies sued Tenenbaum, and a jury awarded damages of $675,000, representing $22,500 for each of thirty songs whose copyright Tenenbaum violated. Tenenbaum appeals the award, claiming that it is so large that it violates his constitutional right to due process of law. We hold that the award did not violate Tenenbaum's right to due process, and we affirm.

The two issues on appeal were: (1) what is the correct standard for evaluating the constitutionality of an award of statutory damages under the Copyright Act; and (2) did an award of $675,000 violate defendant's right to due process?  On issue one, the Court held that the correct standard was that announced in St. Louis, I.M. & S.Ry. Co. v. Williams, 251 U.S. 63 (1919), that a statutory damage award violates due process only "where the penalty prescribed is so severe and oppressive as to be wholly disproportionate to the offense and obviously unreasonable."  On issue two, the Court found that the award did not violate defendant's due process rights.

Florida Long Arm Statute Examined In Copyright Case

Wishfire Enterprises, LLC v. Dancing Ferret Discs, Inc. Index No. 4:11-cv-00092-RH-WCS (N.D. Fla. filed 10/12/11) [Doc. 30].

This is a copyright-infringement and breach-of-contract case. The plaintiff The Cruxshadows is a band that records music and has had three number-one hits. The plaintiff Virgil R. Du Pont, III, is the band‟s lead member. T he other plaintiffs are a limited liability company and corporation that market the band's music under a license from the band or its lead member. All are based in Florida. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted and lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court denied the motion.

The defendant Dancing Ferret Discs, Inc., has a record label and distributes music throughout the United States, including in Florida. Dancing Ferret' s principal place of business is in Pennsylvania. Citing Fla. Stat. § 48.193 (2010) and Cable/Home Communications Corp. v. Network Productions, Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 856-57 (11th Cir. 1990), the Court held that Florida's long-arm statute establishes jurisdiction when a nonresident transmits material into Florida that infringes a Florida resident‟s copyright. "[C]opyright infringement in Florida, though initiated from elsewhere, subjects the infringer to jurisdiction in Florida..."

File Sharing Jury Award Reduced 90%

Sony BMG Music v. Tenenbaum, No. 07 Civ 11446 (D. Mass. memo and order filed July 9, 2010):

This copyright case raises the question of whether the Constitution’s Due Process Clause is violated by a jury’s award of $675,000 in statutory damages against an individual who reaped no pecuniary reward from his infringement and whose individual infringing acts caused the plaintiffs minimal harm. I hold that it is.

Joel Tenenbaum (“Tenenbaum”), the defendant in this action, was accused of using file- sharing software to download and distribute thirty copyrighted songs belonging to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are a group of the country’s biggest recording companies. Their lawsuit against Tenenbaum is one of thousands that they have brought against file sharers throughout the country. Tenenbaum, like many of the defendants in these suits, was an undergraduate when his file- sharing was detected.

Dep't of Justice on Constitutionality of Copyright Statutory Damages

The U.S. Department of Justice's memorandum in defense of the constitutionality of the statutory damages provision of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 504(c). Submitted to the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota in the peer-to-peer file sharing case against defendant Jammie Thomas.

Capitol v Thomas - DOJ Memo in Support of Statutory Damages

No Personal Jurisdiction Over Music Website in Copyright Action

The Royalty Network Inc. v. Dishant.com LLC, No. 08 Civ. 8558 (SHS) (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2009).

Defendant's FRCP 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction granted; plaintiff's request for jurisdictional discovery denied.

Defendants operate a website which invites visitors to play Indian music, to create "playlists" of Indian songs, and to "listen to and download Bollywood Movie ringtones." Plaintiff, the administrator of music owned by non-party music recording company based in India, brought action alleging that defendants' website provides visitors with unauthorized access to music produced by the record company, thereby violating its copyrights and denying Plaintiff royalties to which it is entitled as administrator.

Plaintiff contended that the Court has specific jurisdiction over defendants pursuant to New York's "long arm" statute, CPLR 302(a)(1) and (a)(3)(ii). The Court disagreed.

After discussing the standard on a 12(b)(2) motion, the Court examined whether Defendants' website conferred personal jurisdiction over defendants, who operated the website from Virginia and had no office, real estate or any employee in New York.

Under the "transacts business in" in New York claim for specific jurisdiction, the Court analyzed the "Spectrum of Interactivity" of the Website (passive, interactive, or somewhere in the middle), and found that the website "falls somewhere in the 'middle ground' and thus the jurisdiction inquiry requires closer evaluation of tis contact with New York residents." Plaintiff contended that the following contacts were sufficient: the website was available to NY visitors who could stream and download material from it; the site sells advertisments to NY based companies; and defendants registered the domain name thorugh a NY company.

Plaintiff, however, provided no evidence that any NY resident actually engaged in any transaction on the website (e.g., registered or downloaded material), or that defendants did anything to indicate their knowing and purposeful transaction with NY visitors. Nor was there anything to indicate that defendants sold to, or interacted with the NY office of any of its advertisers (who have national audiences) or that defendants knew that any of those advertisers were headquartered in NY. There was insufficient evidence to support the inference of a purposeful attempt to take advantage of the NY market. Lastly, even if Defendants registered their domain name through a NY company, there was no nexus between that transaction and those at issue (i.e., the connection was merely coincidental).

Under the "tortious conduct out of state causing injury in state" claim, plaintiff fared no better. Although plaintiff's copyright infringmenet claim validly alleged tortious activity and injury within NY, "the jurisdiction inquiry breaks down" becuase plaintiff proffered insufficient evidence to support a finding that it was reasonably foreseeable to defendants that their conduct would cause such injury in NY. (The "reasonable foreseeability" requirement is construed under NY law consistent with U.S. Supreme Court precedent concerning due process.) Plaintiff pointed to neither tangible manifestations of defendants' intent to target NY, nor concrete facts known to defendants that would lead them to foresee being sued in NY. There was no purposeful NY affiliation or discernable effort to target NY. Plaintiff's "sheer speculation" was insufficient.

Lastly, Plaintiff was unable to make a threshold showing that there was some basis for the assertion of jurisdiction to grant jurisdictional discovery. Moreover, plaintiff did not put forward any compelling reasons why discovery should be allowed, nor did it identify any particular facts it would seek to adduce through such discovery or suggest how discovery could aid the Court's jurisdictional inquiry.
Decision Dishant