No Trademark Infringement In Karaoke Case

Phoenix Entertainment v. Rumsey, No. 15-2844 (7th Cir. July 21, 2016).

The 7th Circuit affirmed dismissal of two trademark claims brought by a karaoke company, a serial trademark plaintiff, because the plaintiff had not plausibly alleged that the defendants' conduct resulted in consumer confusion as to the source of any tangible good sold in the marketplace.  Applying the Supreme Court's Dastar decision distinguishing between copyright and trademark claims, the Court noted: "In evaluating Slep-Tone's claims of trademark infringement, we must therefore ask ourselves what the tangible good at issue is, and whether the unauthorized use of the plaintiffs' marks (including trade dress) might cause consumers to be confused about who produced that good. Or is the real confusion, if any, about the source of the creative conduct contained within that good? If the latter, the confusion is not actionable under the Lanham Act."  In the instant case, "The defendants are not selling compact discs with karaoke tracks and billing them as genuine Slep-Tone tracks, in the way that a street vendor might hawk knock-off Yves Saint Laurent bags or Rolex watches to passers-by. Whatever wrong the defendants may have committed by making (or causing to be made) unauthorized copies of Slep-Tone's tracks, they are not alleged to have held out a tangible good sold in the marketplace as a Slep-Tone product. Consequently, the defendants' alleged conduct is not actionable as trademark infringement."

Roc-a-Fella Logo Case Dismissed In Absence Of Contract & On Statute Of Limitations

Walker v. Carter et al., No. 1:12-cv-05384 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 26, 2016) [Doc. 363].

Jay-Z and the other defendants were granted summary judgment in a dispute over the creation, use and ownership of the logo for Roc-a-Fella Records because the plaintiff's contract claim was barred by lack of proof of a contract and the copyright claim was time-barred.  Plaintiff alleged that he was the creative mastermind of the logo two decades ago, and that he was owed royalties under a "lost" contract.  The Court addressed defendants' defense that the "statute of frauds" under New York law barred the claim, and Plaintiff's position that the "lost" contract satisfies the statute of frauds, finding that Plaintiff did not present evidence of the existence of the writing sufficient to create a triable issue of material fact.

As to the copyright claim, the Court noted that the classification of the claim -- as either for infringement or ownership -- determined the statute of limitations issue, and found that the crux of the issue was ownership of the copyright.  It was time-barred based on when the ownership claim accrued.

• Attorney's Fees
• Breach of Contract
• Common Law Copyright Infringement
• Copyright
• Copyright Act
• Declaratory Judgment
• Digital
• DMCA
• EMI
• Infringement
• Licensing
• Motion to Dismiss
• New York Supreme Court
• P2P
• Pre-1972
• Public Performance
• Publishing
• Registration
• Royalties
• Rule 12(b)
• Sound Recording
• Southern District of New York
• Statute of Limitations
• Summary Judgment
• Trademark

Beats, Dre & Iovine May Owe Royalties For More Than First Model Headphone; Question for Jury

Jibe Audio v. Beats Elec., No, B267633 (Cal. App. - 2nd Dist. Sep. 19, 2016).

A California appellate court holds that the headphone company Beats, Dr. Dre and Jimmy Iovine may owe the plaintiff royalties for more than the first headphone model, the Studio model, because the contract at issue (a settlement agreement) was ambiguous and disputes of material fact existed.  Accordingly, summary judgment in favor of the defendants was reversed so that a jury could decide the case.

The case was a question of contract interpretation under California law, and the Court considered extrinsic evidence outside of the 4 corners of the contract.  "The Beats parties and Brunner contend that the Royalty Agreement was only intended to cover one product: the Studio headphone. They argue that the agreement was not intended to cover sales of the entire line of Beats headphones. Lamar, on the other hand, argues that the Royalty Agreement requires Beats to pay a royalty on the sale of every headphone whose design embodies or is a minor or cosmetic modification to the original headphones design."

We find that the contract is ambiguous as to whether it contemplated royalties only for the Studio headphone model or for other headphones that embody the headphones design depicted in Schedule I to the Royalty Agreement. The extrinsic evidence thus must be admitted to assist in the second step of contract interpretation. The factual conflict in the evidence regarding the meaning of the contract must be resolved by a jury. 

BMI Consent Decree Does Not Bar Fractional Licensing, Despite DOJ's Views

U.S. v. BMI, No. 64-3787 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 16, 2016) [Doc. 100].

Judge Stanton of the Southern District of New York holds that the BMI Consent Decree neither bars fractional licensing nor requires full-work licensing, contrary to the Justice Department's recent statement that the PROs are required to offer full-work licenses.  BMI brought its application for construction of its Consent Decree based upon 8/4/16 of the Justice Department's statement, and the Court held that nothing in the Consent Decree supports the Justice Department's view that full-work licensing is required.  The Consent Decree "does not address the possibilities that BMI might license performances of a composition without sufficient legal right to do so, or under a worthless or invalid copyright, or users might perform a music composition licensed by fewer than all of its creators."  Continuing, Judge Stanton stated "The Consent Decree does not regulate the elements of the right to perform compositions. Performance of a composition under an ineffective license may infringe an author's rights under copyright, contract or other law, but it does not infringe the Consent Decree, which does not extend to matters such as the invalidity or value of copyrights of any of the compositions in BMI's repertory"

Court Explains Prior Dismissal of Copyright Claim Concerning Beyonce's LEMONADE Trailer

Fulkes v. Knowles-Carter et al., No. 16-4278 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 12, 2016).

Having previously granted the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for copyright infringement by "bottom-line order," the Court explained the reasons for its ruling.  In this case, the plaintiff alleged that defendants' distribution of a film trailer and the film itself promoting the release of Beyonce's musical album "Lemonade" infringed plaintiff's copyright in the short film "Palinoia." 

On a Rule 12 motion, the Court noted that the works themselves control, not Plaintiff's descriptions in the pleadings, and decided that the works were not substantially similar as a matter of law.  In short, "Plaintiff's alleged similarities consist almost entirely of clearly defined ideas not original to plaintiff and of stock elements with which even a casual observer would be familiar. Moreover, to the very limited extent that there are even any superficial similarities, these are overwhelmed by the works' vastly different creative choices and overall aesthetic feel. "  The Court then went through each of the 9 allegedly similar scenes.

Ricky Martin Music Video Case Must Be Arbitrated; 1st Cir.

Cortes-Ramon v. Sony Corp., No. 15-1786 (1st Cir. Sep. 9, 2016).

Claims against Ricky Martin and his record label were properly dismissed in favor of mandatory arbitration, holds the 1st Circuit affirming the lower court.  The dispute concerned an original song and music video that the plaintiff submitted to Sony as part of a songwriting contest sponsored by Sony.  Plaintiff did not win the contest.  Nonetheless, shortly thereafter Martin released a song and music video -- "Vida" –- that, according to the plaintiff, closely resembled his own contest submission.  

Sony filed a motion seeking, among other things, dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and, in the alternative, a stay pending arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 3.  Sony appended the "Contest Official Rules" to its motion to dismiss.  Those rules contained a mandatory arbitration clause, requiring that disputes "arising under, in connection with, touching upon or relating to" the rules be submitted to an arbitrator.  The District Court granted the motion, dismissing the case with prejudice.  The District Court found that the plaintiff "received, signed, notarized, and returned" an affidavit stating he had complied with the Contest Rules, and noted that "a valid agreement to arbitrate is presumed even when the signed document incorporates by reference an arbitration provision that may be found in another document, irrespective of whether the party received a copy of the document containing the clause." 

On appeal, the plaintiff appealed only the motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim -- not the dismissal on the grounds of the arbitration clause.  Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed.  "Because those rulings provide an independent basis for dismissing his claims, we need not address Cortés's challenge to the District Court's decision to dismiss his complaint on 12(b)(6) factual sufficiency grounds."

Copyright Infringement Claim Against Songwriter Dr. Luke Fails Absent Evidence of "Access"; 9th Cir.

Loomis v. Cornish, No. 13-57093 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 2016).

Plaintiff composer's claim, alleging that high-profile songwriters (including Dr. Luke) stole a two-measure vocal melody and used it as the theme for the verse melody in their hit song “Domino,” failed because the plaintiff did not put forth any potentially admissible evidence to establish that the Domino songwriters had access to plaintiff's song, holds the 9th Circuit in affirming summary judgment for the defendants.

Will Loomis, composer of the song “Bright Red Chords,” alleged that the defendants stole part of his song. The panel held that at summary judgment Loomis failed to put forth any potentially admissible evidence to establish that the Domino songwriters had access to Bright Red Chords, either on a chain-of-events theory or a widespread-dissemination theory. Accordingly, he failed to establish copyright infringement.

Jeremih Can't Avoid Photog's Secondary Copyright Infringement Claims & Model's Publicity Claim Over Album Cover

Rams v. Def Jam Recordings, No. 15-8671 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2016).

Artist Jeremih's Rule 12 motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' secondary copyright infringement claim, and all of the Defendants' motion to dismiss the right of publicity claim under California law, were denied.  The case involves the use of a photo on an album cover on the hit single "Don't Tell 'Em"; the plaintiff photographer alleged copyright infringement against the artist and label, and the plaintiff model alleged violation of her right of publicity.

As to the contributory infringement claim against the defendant artist, the Court held that the photographer stated a claim.  "Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, it is plausible that ... the recording artist, whose work is distributed by UMG under the Def Jam label, would have reason to know of the infringing use of the Subject Image on his own album cover."

As to the vicarious infringement claim against the defendant artist, again the Court held that the photographer stated a claim.  "Plaintiffs state a plausible claim that, as a recording artist...[he] had the right and ability to supervise the selection of cover artwork for his own 'Don't Tell 'Em' single."  Further, the Court found that the complaint sufficiently alleged that the artist benefited financially from the infringement.

As to the model's right of publicity claim, the Court first addressed whether the law of Denmark applied (where the model resides) or whether instead California law applies.  California's choice of law rules applied because the case had been transferred to New York from California district court.  Accordingly, the Court applied the "governmental interest" test under California law, and held that California law should apply.  "Under California law, Rams has sufficiently alleged that Defendants knowingly distributed and profited from the use of her image throughout California without her consent, violating her right of publicity."

Country Stars Beat Copyright Infringement Case Over "Remind Me" Hook

Bowen v. Paisley, No, 13-414 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 25 2016).

Brad Paisley and Carrie Underwood did not infringe plaintiff's song, holds the Court in granting Defendants summary judgment in a case brought by a country music songwriter.  The two songs at issue were called "Remind Me," and specifically their allegedly similar "hooks."  The Court held that the plaintiff had sufficiently established originality and access, but that she has not presented sufficient evidence of substantial similarity between the two works to survive summary judgment.  As to substantial similarity, in sum, plaintiff's expert identified the use of some similar techniques and musical devices, but she did not show that the two Works employ these techniques and devices in the same manner.  Further, these technical similarities were overwhelmed by the broader dissimilarities in context, structure, mood, melody, and harmony—the very features a lay listener would be likely to identify. 

In this case, however, the plaintiff does not allege literal copying of anything except the lyric phrases “remind me” and “baby, remind me,” and she has not shown that the defendants’ use of some of the same musical techniques and melodic features was similar enough to her use of the same techniques and features to render the expressions of the hook phrases in the two Works substantially similar. In short, the court finds that no reasonable juror could conclude, based on the undisputed evidence, that the songs overall, or the “hook” phrases specifically, are substantially similar. 

Label Ordered To Pay Country Singer's Attorney's Fees After Dropping Copyright Suit

A-Blake Records v. Cassidy, No. 14-cv-3401 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2016).

A record label that sued a country singer for copyright infringement, but then conceded that there was no liability and asked the court to dismiss the case with prejudice, was ordered to pay the country singer's attorney's fees under the Copyright Act.  "Because the original suit was baseless, retaliatory, and it promotes the purposes of the copyright law, the singer will be awarded litigation costs and reasonable attorney's fees."  The label, apparently, filed the suit in retaliation for the singer filing for bankruptcy with a $700,000 debt owed the label (the label failed to meet the deadline to dispute the discharge of its claim in the bankruptcy).

Questions Whether LiveNation Willfully Infringed Run-DMC Photos; 9th Cir.

Friedman v. Live Nation Merch., No. 14-55302 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2016).

In a copyright dispute over the use of photographs that the plaintiff took of the hip hop group Run-DMC, defendant Live Nation stipulated that it infringed the plaintiff photographer's copyrights when it used his photos without his authorization on t-shirts and a calendar.  Before the 9th Circuit was the question of whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to permit a jury to conclude that Live Nation committed willful copyright infringement, making it liable for additional damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2); whether a jury could conclude that Live Nation knowingly removed copyright management information (“CMI”) from the photographs in violation of 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b) [the DMCA]; and whether the plaintiff could recover statutory damages awards under section 504 of the Copyright Act measured by the number of retailers who purchased infringing merchandise from Live Nation, even though the plaintiff photographer did not join those retailers as defendants in his suit.

The 9th Circuit held: (1) that there was a triable issue of fact as to whether Live Nation’s infringement was willful, and that the district court therefore erred in granting summary judgment to Live Nation on willfulness; (2) the plaintiff photographer could prevail upon a showing that Live Nation distributed his works with knowledge that copyright management information had been removed, even if Live Nation did not remove it, and accordingly summary judgment should not have been granted because there was a triable issue of fact as to whether Live Nation distributed the photographs with the requisite knowledge; and (3) the district court correctly held that the plaintiff photographer was limited to one award per work infringed by Live Nation because he did not name any of the alleged downstream infringers as defendants in the case ("A plaintiff seeking separate damages awards on the basis of downstream infringement must join the alleged downstream infringers in the action and prove their liability for infringement. ").  Notably, on third question involving downstream infringers, the 9th Circuit rejected a "mass marketing" exception that some lower courts had adopted.

Attorney's Fees Granted To Class Counsel In 'Happy Birthday' Action

Good Morning To You Prods. v. Warner/Chappell, No. 13-4460 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2016) [Doc. 360].

In the "Happy Birthday" class action case, the Court awarded class counsel attorney's fees of over $4.6 million under the Copyright Act.  Plaintiffs requested that the Court apply the percentage method, which courts often use to calculate fees in common-fund cases.  Applying the percentage method, courts typically calculate 25% of the fund as the "benchmark" for a reasonable fee award, providing adequate explanation in the record of any "special circumstances" justifying a departure..  Then, Courts use a rough calculation of the lodestar as a cross-check to assess the reasonableness of the percentage award.  Plaintiffs requested an upward departure from the 25% benchmark.  In considering this request, the Court considered all relevant circumstances, including: (1) the results obtained for the class, (2) effort expended by counsel, (3) counsel’s experience, (4) counsel’s skill, (5) the complexity of the issues, (6) the risks of non-payment assumed by counsel, and (7) the comparison of the benchmark with counsel’s lodestar.

Rapper Enjoined From Using Burberry Trademarks

Burberry Ltd. v. Moise, No. 1:16-cv-05943 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2016) [Doc. 30].

Luxury brand Burberry successfully obtained a preliminary injunction against rapper Perry Moise based on his use of various Burberry-related marks.  The preliminary injunction restrains Perry from using the marks, displaying the marks, using "Burberry Perry" or "Burberry" as usernames on his social media accounts, and otherwise engaging in activity associating himself with Burberry.  Perry was also ordered to remove all references to Burberry on his Soundcloud and iTunes pages, from his email address, and from his various social media accounts.  Plaintiff was ordered to post a $5,000 bond.

Led Zep Publishers Denied Attorney's Fees After "Stairway" Trial

Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin et al., No. CV 15-03462 RGK (AGRx) (C.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2016).

After winning the Led Zeppelin "Stairway To Heaven" trial, the Judge denied the defendant music publishers' motion for approx. $800,000 in attorney's fees and costs under section 505 of the Copyright Act.

Once the media hype and tangential distractions are stripped away, what remains is an objectively reasonable claim motivated by a desire to recognize Randy California’s musical contribution. The claim survived a summary judgment motion and proceeded to a hard-fought trial where a jury found for Plaintiff on ownership and access, but ultimately rendered a verdict for Defendants based on a lack of substantial similarity. Plaintiff was afforded a full opportunity to litigate its theory of infringement and Defendants were entitled to raise a meritorious defense, which ultimately prevailed. Viewing “all the circumstances of [this] case on their own terms, in light of the Copyright Act’s essential goals,” this Court concludes that attorney’s fees are not appropriate. Kirtsaeng, 136 S. Ct. at 1989.

ASCAP & BMI Consent Decrees Will Not Be Modified; DOJ Antitrust Div.

Here is a copy of the Statement of the Department of Justice on the Closing of the Antitrust Division’s Review of the ASCAP and BMI Consent Decrees (Aug. 4, 2016).  In short:

... the consent decrees, which describe the PROs’ licenses as providing the ability to perform “works” or “compositions,” require ASCAP and BMI to offer full-work licenses. The Division reaches this determination based not only on the language of the consent decrees and its assessment of historical practices, but also because only full-work licensing can yield the substantial procompetitive benefits associated with blanket licenses that distinguish ASCAP’s and BMI’s activities from other agreements among competitors that present serious issues under the antitrust laws. Moreover, the Division has determined not to support modifying the consent decrees to allow ASCAP and BMI to offer “fractional” licenses that convey only rights to fractional shares and require additional licenses to perform works. Although stakeholders on all sides have raised some concerns with the status quo, the Division’s investigation confirmed that the current system has well served music creators and music users for decades and should remain intact. The Division’s confirmation that the consent decrees require full-work licensing is fully consistent with preserving the significant licensing and payment benefits that the PROs have provided music creators and music users for decades. 

First, the DOJ described the background of the consent decrees.  Thereafter, the DOJ found that there is broad consensus that ASCAP and BMI as currently constituted fill important and procompetitive roles in the music licensing industry; the consent decrees require full-work licensing; modification of the consent decrees to permit fractional licensing by ASCAP and BMI would not be in the public interest; and other modifications to the consent decrees would not be appropriate at this time (e.g., modified to allow PRO members to “partially withdraw” rights and thereby prevent the PROs from granting licenses that include those rights to certain users (in particular, digital music services) but not to other music users).  Further,  the DOJ stated that assuming ASCAP and BMI proceed in good faith, the Division will forbear for one year from any enforcement action based on any purported fractional licensing by ASCAP or BMI.  Also, the DOJ identified certain guidelines and practices that may be useful as the industry moves towards such a shared understanding on fullwork licensing.  Lastly, the DOJ concluded that the consent decrees remain vital to an industry that has grown up in reliance on them.  But the consent decrees are inherently limited in scope, and a more comprehensive legislative solution may be possible and preferable.

Questions Whether "Iron Man" Comic Theme Song A Work Made For Hire Under 1909 Copyright Act; 2nd Cir.

Urbont v. Sony Music, No. 15-1778 (2d Cir. July 29, 2016).

Plaintiff, who claimed ownership rights in the composition of the "Iron Man" comic theme-song from the 1960s, raised sufficient questions of material fact to rebut defendants' "work made for hire" defense under the 1909 Copyright Act and its "instance and expense" test, holds the Second Circuit in reversing the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants on Plaintiff's copyright infringement claim.  Further, the defendants -- who were not the alleged employer (Marvel Comics was) and therefore a third-party to the alleged relationship -- had standing to assert the work made for hire defense.  However, the appellate court held that the lower court properly dismissed the plaintiff's state-law claims as pre-empted, rejecting the plaintiff's argument that there was a separate pre-1972 sound recording subject to state laws rather than the song as part of an audio-visual work and therefore preempted.

1st Amend. Protects Kanye's Film Name from Trademark Claims

Medina v. Dash Films et al., No. 15-2551 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2016).

In a trademark infringement action against Kanye West and related parties over use of the title "LOISAIDAS" for various films, the Court dismissed (under Rule 12(b)(6)) the complaint of the owner of the trademark LOISAIDAS for rap-names based on the First Amendment right to artistic expression.  Because the term at issue is the title of an artistic work, the Court first asks whether the title has any artistic relevance to the work whatsoever and then, if it does, whether the application of the relevant factors indicates a particularly compelling likelihood of confusion that renders the title explicitly misleading. 

The title “Loisaidas” clearly has artistic relevance to a series of short films about drug dealers seeking to acquire control of the drug trade in Manhattan’s Lower East Side. As noted in the attachments to plaintiff’s complaint, “Loisaidas …. is the Spanish slang term for ‘lower east siders.’” (SAC Exh. B.) The characters repeatedly refer to people and places “downtown in Loisaidas” (Ep. 3, 2:30), and scenes are identifiably set in the Lower East Side (see, e.g., Ep. 2, 0:59 (character bikes past Katz’s Deli)). The copyrighted term was “not arbitrarily chosen just to exploit the publicity value of [plaintiff’s music duo] but instead ha[s] genuine relevance to the film’s story.” Rogers, 875 F.2d at 1001. 

Next, the Court found that the title was not explicitly misleading.  The term was not a source denoter.  In conclusion:

Consideration of plaintiff’s complaint and the expressive work that prompted it permits only one conclusion: that the work is a film, and that its title is artistically relevant to its content and not explicitly misleading as to any association with plaintiff’s music duo. Given the First Amendment values at interest, the Lanham Act and its state law counterparts have been and must be construed not to reach such expression. 

Cruz Campaign Can't Avoid Copyright Infringement & Contract Claims

Leopona, Inc. et al. v. Cruz for President, No. 00658-2016 (W.D. Wash. July 11, 2016).

In a case involving former presidential candidate Ted Cruz's use of two licensed songs in YouTube videos supporting his campaign, the Court denied Cruz's motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' copyright infringement and breach of contract claims.  The breach of contract claim, which included a $25,000 liquidated damages provision, arose out of a license agreement that restricted use of the licensed song for political purposes.  The court held that the licensor's claim was not pre-empted by section 301 of the Copyright Act because the licensor was not the copyright owner (it was a distribution and licensing service), and the actual copyright owners (the song's authors) had not brought breach of contract claims -- they had brought only copyright infringement claims.  Lastly, on the claim for an injunction, the Court held that it was not moot due to suspension of the Cruz campaign because the YouTube videos were still available online.

"Happy Birthday" Is In The Public Domain, Declares Court

Good Morning To You v. Warner/Chappell Music, 13-cv-4460 (C.D. Cal. filed June 30, 2016).

In the "Happy Birthday" case, the Court entered a final order and judgment declaring that the song is in the public domain and otherwise approving the parties' class-action settlement. Per the parties' agreement, class counsel was awarded fees, and the named plaintiffs also received incentive fees.

Pre-72 Sound Recordings Question Heading To Florida Supreme Court

Flo & Eddie v. Sirius XM, No. 15-13100 (11th Cir. Jun. 29, 2016).

In "The Turtles" appeal from a decision granting Sirius XM summary judgment on the common law copyright infringement claim concerning the public performance of pre-1972 sound recordings, the 11th Circuit deferred its decision pending a determination of the state-law question by Florida's highest court.  The lower court had decided, in favor of Sirius, that Florida common law does not recognize an exclusive right of performance.  On appeal, the 11th Circuit discussed an old (1943) Florida Supreme Court case involving magic tricks and found that the case "indicates that there is at least a significant argument that Florida common law may recognize a common law property right in sound recordings."  However, the 11th Circuit also indicated that the old magic trick case indicated that "publication" of the intellectual property could result in termination of the common law copyright.

Neither the Supreme Court of Florida nor any of the Florida District Courts of Appeal have addressed whether Florida common law would recognize copyright protection for sound recordings, and if so, whether the sales to the public of Flo & Eddie’s sound recordings or the public performance thereof would constitute a publication or dedication to the public which would terminate the copyright protection in whole or in part.

Accordingly, the 11th Cir. certified the following questions to the Florida Supreme Court.

Because Florida law is not clear on these matters, we certify to the Supreme Court of Florida the questions of whether Florida common law copyright extends to pre-1972 sound recordings and, if so, whether it includes an exclusive right of public performance and/or an exclusive right of reproduction. We also certify the question of whether Flo & Eddie has forfeited any common law copyright by publication. Additionally, to the extent that Florida recognizes a common law copyright in sound recordings including a right of exclusive reproduction, we certify the question of whether the backup or buffer copies made by Sirius constitute infringement of Flo & Eddie’s common law copyright.

Lastly, to the extent that Florida does not recognize a common law copyright in sound recordings, or to the extent that such a copyright was terminated by publication, the 11th Circuit certified the question of whether plaintiff nevertheless has a cause of action for common law unfair competition / misappropriation, common law conversion, or statutory civil theft.